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  not too long ago, conventional wisdom in academic and central 
banking circles held that monetary policy had become increasingly effective 
the past quarter century. Growth had become steadier. recessions were shorter 
and less frequent. Inflation rates in much of the world had converged to low 
and relatively stable levels. This complacent view was shattered the past two 
years as a global financial crisis and severe recession raised doubts about 
central banks’ performance. 
To combat the crisis, the Federal reserve put the target federal funds 
rate on a downward trajectory, taking it to near zero by year-end 2008. By it-
self, this traditional monetary policy stimulus proved insufficient to stem the 
output and employment declines or to reduce financial instability. so the Fed 
took the boldest policy actions in its 96-year history. 	 EconomicLetter	 Federal reserve Bank oF dallas 2 	 Federal reserve Bank oF dallas  EconomicLetter
In 2008, the central bank created 
several special lending facilities that 
bypassed traditional financial channels 
for providing credit to the private sec-
tor in the U.S. and abroad. In 2009, it 
augmented the monetary stimulus with 
quantitative easing, a strategy of reduc-
ing longer-term interest rates through 
purchases of assets such as Treasuries 
and mortgage-backed securities.
In 2010, the U.S. economy has 
been showing signs of pulling out of 
its tailspin. But questions remain about 
why it took so much monetary policy 
firepower to deal with the crisis. 
We look for answers in the finan-
cial channels that transmit monetary 
policy to the real economy and the 
regulatory scheme designed to keep 
the banking system sound. The chan-
nels clogged when the regulatory 
apparatus didn’t ensure that banks 
were healthy enough to lend—a situa-
tion exacerbated by the growing influ-
ence of very large, systemically impor-
tant financial institutions, the so-called 
too-big-to-fail banks.
How It Should Be
Monetary and regulatory policies 
operate in tandem to facilitate the money 
and credit flows vital to a modern econ-
omy. Central banks conduct monetary 
policy with an eye toward providing 
the macroeconomic stability and liquid-
ity that encourage financial institutions 
to lend to businesses and consumers. 
Financial regulators strive to ensure 
lenders don’t take on excessive risk. 
Before examining monetary and 
regulatory policies in the crisis, we will 
review how they’re designed to work. 
Monetary policy. The Fed 
typically influences economic activity 
through the target federal funds rate, 
the interest rate that banks charge one 
another for unsecured overnight loans. 
The Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) meets every six weeks or so to 
decide whether to increase, decrease or 
stand pat on this primary policy lever.
Federal funds rate changes impact 
the constellation of market interest 
rates, working primarily through the 
These four channels summarize 
how economic textbooks describe 
monetary policy’s impact on the real 
economy. For the most part, the text-
books get it right—at least for the 
quarter century of highly effective 
monetary policy.
The channels’ proper function-
ing led Gordon Sellon, the Kansas 
City Fed’s former director of research, 
to write in 2002: “Bank lending rates 
on consumer and business loans and 
mortgage rates now appear to exhibit 
a much stronger and faster response 
to monetary policy actions than in the 
past. Moreover, institutional changes, 
such as the increased use of variable-
rate loans and the availability of low-
cost mortgage refinancing, may have 
altered the transmission mechanism, 
potentially broadening the influence 
of monetary policy on the economy.”2
Sellon’s observation reflects a con-
ventional wisdom that was right on—at 
the time. However, monetary policy’s 
channels function smoothly only when 
banks hold enough capital to safeguard 
against bad loans and other risks. Well-
capitalized banks can expand credit to 
the private sector in concert with mon-
etary policy easing. Undercapitalized 
banks are in no position to lend money 
to the private sector, sapping the effec-
tiveness of monetary policy. 
The bank capital linkage com-
pletes the financial market architecture 
of effective monetary policy (Figure 
1).3 However, it’s regulatory policy—
not monetary policy—that focuses on 
ensuring banks maintain healthy capi-
tal ratios. 
Regulatory policy. History 
teaches us that financial markets—par-
ticularly unregulated ones—experience 
the exuberance of excess risk-taking 
in boom times, followed by the pain 
of hard landings. When busts occur, 
bank failures are particularly unset-
tling because they can have devastat-
ing effects on consumers, companies, 
industries and even the economy as a 
whole.
For these reasons, all modern 
economies seek to ensure the safety 
banking and financial system. Over 
time, movements in market interest 
rates impact real economic activity 
through four primary channels.1
When the FOMC adjusts the 
federal funds rate, banks’ cost of 
funds rises or falls in tandem with that 
rate. Financial institutions respond by 
revising the terms and conditions on 
loans they offer borrowers, creating a 
bank loan channel that alters credit 
availability throughout the economy. 
The price and availability of credit 
influence buying and investment 
decisions, slowing or speeding up 
overall economic activity.
A securities market channel 
operates through money and capital 
markets, where interest rates gener-
ally move in the same direction as the 
federal funds rate. Changes in the price 
and availability of nonbank financing 
influence the borrowing decisions that 
determine larger businesses’ employ-
ment and output decisions. Smaller 
companies and individuals usually 
borrow from banks and other financial 
intermediaries.
An asset prices and wealth 
channel works through interest rate 
changes’ effect on market prices for a 
range of assets—such as bonds, equi-
ties, and homes and other real estate. 
Consumers and businesses carry these 
assets on their balance sheets and use 
them as collateral for loans. Changes in 
borrowing capacity directly affect credit 
use. The perceived value of the assets 
also factors into households’ decisions 
to spend, borrow and save out of cur-
rent income.
Finally, interest rate changes 
impact the relative attractiveness of U.S. 
investments, creating an exchange rate 
channel. When rates rise or fall faster 
in the U.S. than in other countries, 
foreign investors respond by acquir-
ing or divesting dollar-denominated 
assets. These transactions alter currency 
values, which in turn affect the rela-
tive prices of imports and exports. The 
price changes filter through to demand 
for goods and services, affecting over-
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and soundness of the financial indus-
try. Regulation entails setting rules for 
institutions’ operations, activities and 
ownership. Supervision involves moni-
toring them to verify that they comply 
with the regulations.
The Fed shares regulatory and 
supervisory duties with the Comptroller 
of the Currency, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corp. (FDIC) and Office 
of Thrift Supervision. The financial 
institution’s charter largely determines 
each agency’s responsibilities. The 
Fed’s regulatory responsibility lies with 
bank holding companies, those state-
chartered banks that have chosen to be 
under Fed supervision and some for-
eign banking operations in the U.S.
The savings and loan crisis of 
the 1980s prompted regulatory reform 
designed to preserve the solvency 
of federal deposit insurance and to 
restore confidence in the banking 
system. The resulting legislation man-
dated an approach, dubbed prompt 
corrective action (PCA), designed to 
remedy banks’ potential balance-sheet 
problems before they could fester.4 It 
requires undercapitalized banks to take 
immediate steps to restore their finan-
cial integrity.
To be considered well-capital-
ized, banks are required to maintain 
capital-to-risk-weighted asset ratios 
of at least 10 percent. In hard times, 
higher-than-anticipated loan losses can 
force banks to take writedowns that 
erode their capital bases. When the 
key capital ratio slips below 8 percent, 
regulators begin to invoke a series of 
PCA procedures that include restrain-
ing asset growth. Once the ratio falls 
below 6 percent, banks face further 
requirements that include raising equity 
capital and restricting dividends and 
bonuses. Taking these actions forces 
banks to replenish their capital bases, 
restoring their capacity to lend. 
Some troubled banks may be too 
weak for this kind of remedial action. 
Figure 1
The Channels from Monetary Policy to the Economy: 
Monetary and Bank Regulatory Policies Aren’t Independent but Work in Tandem
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Over time, movements 
in market interest rates 
impact real economic 
activity through four 
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Widespread jitters 
sent the cost of raising 
new capital through 
the roof, reinforcing a 
lesson of past crises: 
Capital is prohibitively 
expensive when 
needed most.
changes have allowed banks to oper-
ate nationwide, offer a wider range of 
services and invest in riskier and ever 
more complex financial instruments.6
This business environment has 
fostered bigness. In 1990, the 10 larg-
est U.S. banks had almost 25 percent 
of the industry’s assets. Their share 
grew to 44 percent in 2000 and almost 
60 percent in 2009. The two biggest 
banks in housing finance had 44 per-
cent of U.S. mortgage originations in 
2009, and the top four had 58 percent.
Mammoth financial institutions 
confound regulation and supervision 
because their operations are global, 
highly complex and often opaque. As 
the financial crisis unfolded, it became 
evident that top managers at some 
big banks didn’t thoroughly grasp 
the risks involved in their institutions’ 
investment decisions.7 For supervisory 
agencies, this overwhelming complex-
ity makes determining the condition 
of such banks an epic undertaking in 
time and manpower—an obstacle to 
the “prompt” in PCA.
Perhaps more important, putting 
the “troubled bank” tag on a TBTF 
institution has daunting consequences. 
The biggest banks have tentacles that 
reach deep into other financial institu-
tions, industries and countries, creating 
a potential for serious and unforeseen 
consequences from PCA. Shutting 
down a TBTF bank is a worst-case 
scenario that involves immense cost—
directly for the FDIC and indirectly for 
the economy.8
In the financial crisis that began in 
2007, widespread mortgage loan losses 
at banks led to massive writedowns. 
The number of problem institutions 
rose from 90 in first quarter 2008 to 
702 in fourth quarter 2009.9 The assets 
of those troubled institutions totaled 
$403 billion, the equivalent of a few 
large regional banks, suggesting that 
none of the largest—i.e., TBTF—
banks ever reached the point of being 
declared a problem bank or being sub-
jected to PCA intervention.
Yet some of the largest banks 
were no doubt crippled. The financial 
PCA requires that critically undercapi-
talized banks enter receivership or be 
sold while still solvent, thereby mini-
mizing losses to the FDIC.
PCA breaks down if troubled 
banks are overlooked or undiscovered 
by regulators. Loan losses worsen, 
leading to tighter lending standards 
and slower or even declining lending 
activity. Scarce credit slows economic 
growth, bringing about new rounds 
of loan losses and writedowns among 
a widening circle of banks. And on it 
goes, eventually leading to hardship 
for the overall economy.
When functioning properly, PCA 
alleviates banking problems before 
they grow big enough to threaten the 
economy. However, problems arise 
when PCA doesn’t live up to its name.
Enter ‘Too Big to Fail’
Regulatory action that’s both 
prompt and corrective should go a long 
way toward reducing the risk of enter-
ing the downward spiral of credit and 
economic activity that can follow loan 
losses and writedowns. The macroeco-
nomic spillovers that threaten economic 
stability come from delayed corrective 
action, which allows troubled banks to 
put off the painful task of getting their 
balance sheets in order. The balance 
sheet problems just worsen.
What interferes with PCA? For 
starters, it could be a lot of banks get-
ting into trouble at the same time—
victims of the same shock. Regulators 
can’t carry out PCA at that many banks 
quickly enough, and at least some 
troubled banks will be left to deterio-
rate further.5 Instead of getting well, 
the sick banks get sicker, tighten credit 
standards and rein in lending. The 
cumulative impact is slower growth in 
the overall economy, causing additional 
loan losses and feeding the downward 
spiral of credit and economic activity.
Too-big-to-fail (TBTF) banks are 
an even greater potential drag on PCA. 
Our financial system has changed a 
great deal since the introduction of 
PCA. The past two decades’ financial-
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press certainly knew of the problems. 
Starting in early 2007, one article after 
another told of industry giants suffer-
ing huge losses on what would even-
tually be described as “toxic assets” 
(Table 1). Investors were also aware of 
the problems. In 2007 and 2008, bank 
stock prices plunged as the public 
lost confidence in bank managers and 
regulators (Chart 1).
What Went Awry
Facing rapidly deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions in 2008, the Fed 
turned to its traditional monetary 
policy tool—the federal funds rate. 
Policymakers assumed lower interest 
rates and sharp increases in discount-
window lending would have a positive 
impact on the real economy through 
monetary policy’s transmission channels.
It didn’t happen. The macroeco-
nomic imperative called for maintain-
ing and expanding private-sector loans. 
However, banks’ focus was microeco-
nomic—the erosion of their capital 
ratios. Banks faced an urgent need 
to shore up balance sheets by raising 
capital and selling or otherwise reduc-
ing assets. But widespread jitters sent 
the cost of raising new capital through 
the roof, reinforcing a lesson of past 
crises: Capital is prohibitively expen-
sive when needed most.
Banks’ diminished capacity to 
lend had important implications for 
monetary policy. The growing pres-
ence of undercapitalized banks blocked 
the channels that transmit central bank 
actions to the real economy. In time, 
the FDIC could whittle down the 
number of troubled banks by closing 
and merging smaller institutions. What 
the system couldn’t deal with was the 
TBTF institutions, which by their nature 
couldn’t be put out of business in the 
midst of a financial crisis.
Troubled banks left in place clog 
up monetary policy mechanisms. The 
bank loan channel behaved per-
versely. The FOMC aggressively low-
ered the federal funds rate, anticipating 
that interest rates on bank credit would 
go down, too. In their efforts to ration 
ter most—those paid by businesses 
and households—rose rather than fell, 
thwarting the Fed’s goal of reducing 
rates to stimulate the economy.
the limited capital remaining on their 
balance sheets, however, banks facing 
loan losses tightened credit standards 
and retrenched, and the rates that mat-
Table 1 
Selected Timeline of Global Financial Industry Distress:  
February 2007–January 2008
Feb. 8, 2007 Increase in bad home loans to high-risk borrowers in U.S. 
shakes HSBC, heightens perceived risk of corporate debt
April 2, 2007 New Century Financial, a leading subprime mortgage lender, 
files Chapter 11 bankruptcy
June 23–Aug. 2, 2007 Bear  Stearns  fights  to  save  two  ailing  hedge  funds  by 
pledging billions of dollars and suspending redemptions, 
but it fails; both funds file for bankruptcy
Aug. 9, 2007 BNP Paribas, France’s largest bank, halts redemptions on 
three investment funds after it is unable to value subprime 
mortgage assets
Aug. 14, 2007 Goldman Sachs and investors inject $3 billion into the firm’s 
flailing quantitative hedge fund
Sept. 14–17, 2007 Northern Rock, the United Kingdom’s fifth-largest mortgage 
lender, receives emergency funds from the Bank of England; 
the government guarantees savings deposits
Oct. 5, 2007 Following similar warnings by Citigroup, UBS and Credit 
Suisse, Merrill Lynch warns of major writedowns for bad 
investments  linked  to  U.S.  subprime  mortgage  defaults; 
Washington Mutual joins with warnings of major losses
Oct. 16, 2007 Citigroup begins a string of major writedowns based on 
subprime mortgage loans
Oct. 24, 2007 Merrill Lynch announces an $8.4 billion writedown related 
to mortgage losses
Oct. 30–Nov. 4, 2007 Merrill Lynch CEO Stanley O’Neal and Citigroup CEO Charles 
Prince step down amid major losses
Nov. 13, 2007 Bank of America reveals need to write down $3 billion in 
debt securities due to subprime mortgage defaults
Dec. 10, 2007 UBS posts a $10 billion writedown in debts linked to the 
subprime U.S. mortgage sector
Dec. 14, 2007 Citigroup attempts to rescue seven structured investment 
vehicles in $58 billion debt bailout
Dec. 20, 2007 Morgan Stanley takes a $9.4 billion writedown of assets and 
sells a $5 billion stake to a Chinese sovereign wealth fund
Jan. 15–23, 2008 Bank of America joins the parade of firms with mortgage-
related losses, following Citigroup’s $22.2 billion writedown 
and Merrill Lynch’s sale of a $6.6 billion stake to foreign 
investors
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Bank of New York timeline, www.newyorkfed.org/research/global_economy/Crisis_Timeline.pdf; 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis timeline, http://timeline.stlouisfed.org/index.cfm?p=timeline; Credit Writedowns,  
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The securities market channel 
constricted because investors hunkered 
down as the rapidly deteriorating con-
ditions of many TBTF banks slowed 
the economy and shattered overall 
confidence. Toxic assets’ deadweight 
impeded the flows of debt and equity 
capital to businesses and consumers. 
In past crises, large companies had 
the alternative of issuing bonds when 
troubled banks raised rates or curtailed 
lending. This time, capital markets 
offered little relief.10
When the crisis sent private-sector 
interest rates up rather than down, the 
value of homes, stocks, bonds and 
other assets fell, impeding the asset 
prices and wealth channel. In a flight 
to cash, households and businesses 
turned to balance sheet deleveraging—
that is, asset sales, even at unattractive 
prices. Debt and new borrowing tum-
bled at the worst possible time. 
The exchange rate channel failed 
for several reasons. First, official policy 
rates fell, but rising interest rates for 
private-sector borrowers made U.S. 
assets more attractive. Second, the 
With its conventional policy tools 
blocked, the Fed resorted to unprec-
edented measures the past two years, 
opening new channels to bypass the 
blocked ones and restore the econo-
my’s credit flows. While the extraor-
dinary measures helped stabilize the 
economy, the fact remains that mon-
etary policy didn’t work as it should 
have. In retrospect, it is clear that 
TBTF financial institutions were clog-
ging the channels vital to the proper 
functioning of monetary policy. 
Connecting the Dots 
PCA is well-intentioned, but it 
assumes that bank failures are isolated 
events, a notion that made sense before 
the banking system became so highly 
concentrated and interconnected. Even 
more problematic, PCA isn’t equipped 
for the challenges of too-big-to-fail 
financial institutions. When a lot of 
banks are in trouble at once, or when 
one or more TBTF institutions are tot-
tering, efforts to keep the financial 
system sound are delayed—with poten-
tially serious implications for monetary 
policy.
It may be possible to restore 
promptness to PCA by expanding the 
capacity for supervision and remedial 
action—at least for non-TBTF banks 
that run into problems. Until we 
address issues surrounding TBTF, how-
ever, the biggest, most complex insti-
tutions will remain a potential danger 
for two reasons. First, their size, geo-
graphic reach and complexity render 
them too complex to manage. Second, 
these characteristics make them an 
overwhelming challenge for regula-
tors. Supervisors must rely on the same 
opaque and confounding accounting 
and management information used by 
the banks themselves.
Many ideas have been put forward 
to reduce the threat of TBTF banks so 
that they won’t undermine bank regula-
tory policies, frustrate monetary policy 
and weaken the economy in the future. 
Among the proposals: (a) increasing 
capital, (b) reducing leverage and size, 
(c) imposing product limitations, (d) 
simultaneous drop in official policy 
rates in other countries experiencing 
similar financial problems reduced the 
incentive for foreigners to purchase 
U.S. assets, goods and services. Third, 
investors fled to the safety of the U.S. 
dollar, pushing its value up.11
Because of the blockages in these 
channels, PCA was ineffective in an 
era of TBTF banks (Figure 2). The 
problems originated with several very 
large, systemically important finan-
cial institutions that were experienc-
ing similar shocks and hemorrhaging 
losses. Because PCA loses its “prompt” 
in the case of TBTF banks, problems 
festered, causing negative spillovers in 
the rest of the economy. 
TBTF banks became the propa-
gating mechanism for an adverse 
feedback loop between the banking 
system and the economy. As a result, 
traditional monetary policy lost much 
of its effectiveness. The obstructions in 
monetary policy channels worsened a 
recession that has been longer, deeper 
and more painful than any post-World 
War II slump. 
Chart 1
Bank Stock Prices Plunge Amid Turmoil
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NOTE: Index based on average stock price of Citigroup Inc., Bank of America Corp. and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 
TARP is the Troubled Asset Relief Program.
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real economy requires sound financial 
institutions that are well-capitalized and 
willing to lend. It’s the job of regulation 
and supervision to weed out the weak 
banks so their inability to lend doesn’t 
block monetary policy channels. 
This reliance on well-functioning 
banks gives central bankers a vital 
need for precisely targeted, real-time 
data on the health of the financial 
system and the institutions within it. 
These data can affect central bank 
decisions such as the timing, strength 
and tactics of monetary policy actions, 
including lender-of-last-resort policies 
and decisions. Incomplete or dated 
information increases the chances for 
errors.
Monetary and regulatory policies 
are inseparable. The Fed’s supervisory 
role puts the central bank’s finger 
directly on the pulse of the financial 
system, providing a tool that serves 
the goal of effective monetary policy-
making. While the Fed has accepted 
criticism for failing to detect potential 
problems prior to the crisis, the fail-
ure only highlights the need for better 
integration of monetary and regulatory 
policies. Stripping the Fed of regulatory 
functions would compromise the con-
duct of monetary policy.
Rosenblum is executive vice president 
and director of research at the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Dallas. Renier is senior 
economic analyst and coordinator 
of economic and financial analysis 
in the bank’s Research Department. 
Alm is writer in residence at Southern 
Methodist University’s O’Neil Center for 
Global Markets and Freedom.
enhancing supervision, (e) improving 
market discipline and (f) breaking up 
TBTF institutions before the next crisis.12
While any of these proposals 
might help, there’s no doubt risk man-
agement needs improvement, perhaps 
as part of a regulatory and supervisory 
overhaul. The merits of imposing con-
trols over the freewheeling and unregu-
lated segments of the financial services 
industry, often called the shadow bank-
ing system, also deserve some focus 
and debate.13 Clearly, some combina-
tion of these general reform recom-
mendations is needed to reduce the 
probability, frequency and magnitude 
of future financial bubbles.
Even if we reduce the TBTF 
threat, monetary policy will still depend 
heavily on effective regulatory policy. 
Transmitting the Fed’s actions to the 
Figure 2
Monetary Policy Channels Blocked in Crisis, Especially in Era of Too-Big-to-Fail Banks
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When banks are undercapitalized, an adverse feedback loop of tightening credit directly affects terms of bank loans, the 
securities market and asset prices, thus undermining ofﬁcial interest rate policy. These same channels, along with the 
exchange rate, are adversely affected in indirect ways through sticky market interest rates as a result of bank retrenchment. 
If undercapitalized, too-big-to-fail banks are major obstacles to effective monetary policy because of their size, complexity 
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